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NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN SAFETY AND PRODUCTION'
JONATHAN L. F. SILVER *
I. INTRODUCTION: ENJOINING STRIKES WHILE PROTECTING THE
SAFETY OF THE WORKPLACE
For two decades the United States Supreme Court has encouraged
management and labor to agree to settle all disputes by peaceful, binding ar-
bitration, without resort to the stronger weapons of strikes and lockouts.' To
strengthen this policy, the Court has not only allowed employers to receive
damages' when employees strike over issues that should have been submitted
to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. The Court also has
enjoined such strikes. 3 Another national policy — increased safety in the
workplace* — can conflict with the Court's policy of promoting arbitration and
discouraging strikes. Under provisions of the Labor Management Relations
Acts (LMRA), the Wagner Act, 6 the Mine Safety and Health Act' (MSHA),
and the Occupational Safety and Health Acta (OSHA), Congress has
prevented employers in a variety of circumstances from retaliating against
employees who complain, outside the arbitration process about unsafe working
conditions, or who stop working due to dangerous conditions. Each statutory
provision could be construed to conflict with the policy of promoting arbitra-
tion and preventing work stoppages. The Supreme Court has avoided such a
conflict, however, in both instances where it has considered a safety statute's
applicability. The Court has construed section 502 of the LMRA to require ob-
t 	 © 1981 by Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. B.A. Yale Universi-
ty 1969; J.D. University of Pennsylvania 1973. I thank Loretta Gastwirth, Cardozo '82, for her
excellent research and considerable contributions to the development of the ideas in this article.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
455-56 (1957).
See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 97, 106 (1962).
3
 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970).
overruling, Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
4 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 651(b) (1976) (reciting the purposes of the Occupational Safety
& Health Act).
5 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976).
6 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
30 U.S.C. 55 801-962 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). When the Federal Mine Safety &
Health Act was first enacted, its title was the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 30
U.S.C. 5 801 (Supp. III 1979). Many decisions refer to the Act by that original title. See. e.g..
GateWay Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 370-71 n.1 (1974). The
name was changed as part of the 1977 amendments to the Act. 30 U.S.C. 5 801 (Supp. III 1979).
This article will refer to the Act by its present title, or as the MSHA.
29 U.S.C.	 660(c)(1) (1976).
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jective evidence of unsafe conditions to justify an employee work stoppage, 9
and has ruled that section 7 of the Wagner Act does not protect an employee's
refusal to work when a collective bargaining agreement exists and provides for
arbitration.'° Recent developments under OSHA, however, have increased the
potential for conflict between the two policies. In 1973, the Secretary of Labor
issued a regulation under OSHA, which, after stated qualifications, specifically
authorizes an employee to refuse to work on the ground that a hazardous con-
dition exists. Under the regulation, the employee is to suffer no adverse
employment consequences from his actions," even if reasonable but only sub-
9
 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 386-87
(1974) (construing 5 502 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976)).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17
(1962) (construing 5 7 of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976)).
The MSHA has not yet been construed to avoid a conflict between the two policies, but
unlike OSHA, sec text at notes 11-13 infra, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on MSHA as a
source of work refusal by reason of unsafe conditions. Lower court decisions, however, discussed
in text at notes 128-42 infra, show a burgeoning conflict between the policies through construction
of MSHA.
" 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.12 (1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 2681, 2683 (Jan. 29, 1973), corrected, 38
Fed. Reg. 4577 (Feb. 16, 1973). The regulation in its present form is at 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.12
(1980). Subsection (a) asserts that the Act's explicit provision of some rights necessarily implies
the existence of others. Id. at 5 1977.12(a). Subsection (b)(1) states the way in which imminent
hazards generally will be handled. Id. at 1977.12(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) provides for the right
to refuse imminently hazardous work, and the conditions that surround the right. Id. at 5
1977.12(b)(2).
The regulation in full reads as follows:
(a) In addition to protecting employees who file complaints, institute pro-
ceedings, or testify in proceedings under or related to the Act, section
11(c) also protects employees from discrimination occurring because of
the exercise 'of any rights afforded by this Act.' Certain rights are ex-
plicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to participate
as a party in enforcement proceedings (sec. 10). Certain other rights
exist by necessary implication. For example, employees may request
information from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration;
such requests would constitute the exercise of a right afforded by the
Act. Likewise, employees interviewed by agents of the Secretary in the
course of inspections or investigations could not subsequently be dis-
criminated against because of their cooperation.
(b)(1) On the other hand, review of the Act and examination of the legisla-
tive history discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right af-
forded by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job
because of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. Hazardous
conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be cor-
rected by the employer, once brought to his attention. If corrections
are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the existence of a
hazard, the employee will normally have opportunity to request in-
spection of the workplace pursuant to section 8(f) of the Act, or to
seek the assistance of other public agencies which have responsibility
in the field of safety and health. Under such circumstances, there-
fore, an employer would not ordinarily be in violation of section
11(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for refusing to per-
form normal job activities because of alleged safety or health
hazards.
(2) However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted
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jective fears were the basis for the refusal to work." In a recent decision
upholding the Secretary's authority to promulgate this regulation," the
Supreme Court did not mention, and hence left unresolved, the question of
whether the regulation would apply to a dispute about a safety condition
deemed to be arbitrable. Thus, the Court has created the potential for a head-
on conflict between the two national policies of preventing strikes and pro-
moting safety in the workplace. On the one hand, the Court has limited the
availability of strikes by ruling that the LMRA requires objective evidence of a
health hazard to support a refusal to work. On the other hand, the Court has
promoted the policy of safety in the workplace by upholding an OSHA regula-
tion which allows safety concerns to excuse refusals to work if supported by
reasonable, albeit subjective, evidence.
This article will address the question of whether the OSHA regulations
should be interpreted broadly — first, to apply its subjective standard of
danger to a refusal to work regardless of the arbitrability of the safety dispute,
and second, to prohibit a union from waiving the employee's right to refuse
dangerous work in a collective bargaining agreement. Before reaching those
questions, however, it is necessary to review the development of the Court's
arbitration/no-strike policy. It will also be helpful to show how the National
Labor Relations Board, the courts, and the federal agencies charged with en-
forcing safety statutes have construed Congress' will. Finally, analysis of the
legislative purpose of OSHA, when considered against the background first to
be developed, will demonstrate that the Court's policy of minimizing work
with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting
himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition
at the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative,
refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition,
he would be protected against subsequent discrimination. The con-
dition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury must
be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circum-
stances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is
a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient
time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger
through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels. In addi-
tion, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible, must
also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a
correction of the dangerous condition.
Id. at 5 1977.12.
" No court has actually held that the regulation protects an employee if he was
reasonable, regardless of whether he was accurate. The regulation on its face, however, adopts a
reasonable perception standard. 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.12 (1980). But if that were enough, one would
have thought that 5 502 of the LMRA, by using the words "good faith" could be said to have
adopted reasonableness on its face. 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976). In any event, every court that has
considered the regulation has assumed that it requires only a reasonable belief, and this article is
based on that assumption. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 21 (1980); Mar-
shall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Marshall v. Daniel Constr. Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 707, 714-15 (5th
Cir. 1977).
" Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
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stoppages and the accompanying disruption of production by narrowing safety
as a defense to such employee activities should not be extended to cir-
cumstances described in the OSHA regulation, regardless of the existence or
content of a collective bargaining agreement. Instead, subjective evidence of a
health hazard, as required by the OSHA regulation, should be held sufficient
to justify an employee's refusal to work.
II. THE CONTROVERSY DELIMITED
A. Enjoining Strikes
For two decades the Supreme Court has steadily promoted a policy of re-
quiring grievance arbitration in lieu of strikes or lockouts, whenever a collec-
tive bargaining agreement can be construed to support such a result. In Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama," the Court laid a founda-
tion for building a national policy of preventing strikes and lockouts. In Lincoln
Mills, the Court held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act" gave the federal courts authority to create a federal common law for the
construction of collective bargaining agreements.' 6 More specifically, the
Court held that the plaintiff union was entitled to an order against the defend-
ant employer compelling the latter to submit the union's grievances to arbitra-
tion, as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement." In the Court's
view, Congress wanted to encourage a collective bargaining process that
resulted in agreements not to strike." Furthermore, the Court stated,
legislative history revealed that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes
was considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike agreement.'"g Thus, in order to
avoid a strike, the Court ordered that the grievance be arbitrated in accordance
with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court subsequently strengthened the arbitration/no-strike policy that
lay behind Lincoln Mills. In the Steelworkers' Trilogy, 20 the Court granted near
finality to the awards of arbitrators, recognizing a narrow, indeed nearly
nonexistent, power of the courts to review such awards." The Steelworkers'
Trilogy Court also adopted a presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes in
cases where there is both a collective bargaining agreement and a broadly
worded no-strike clause. 22 Noting that the purpose of labor arbitration is to
14 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15 29 U.S.C. $ 185 (1976).
16
 353 U.S. at 455-57.
17 Id. at 449, 457-59.
10 Id. at 453.
19 Id. at 455.
20 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Unitec .
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) [hereinafter
cited and referred to as Steelworkers Trilogy].
21 Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. at 567-68, 596.
22 Id. at 582-83, 584-85.
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prevent industrial strife," the Court concluded that arbitration should be re-
quired in every collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration provision
unless the agreement expressly providei otherwise." Thus, the Court took the
position that agreements to submit a particular grievance to arbitration rather
than strike need not be express — they may be implied from broad arbitration
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement." Shortly thereafter the
Court extended the rule of Lincoln Mills and its progeny to the state courts," re-
quiring them to follow federal law." At the same time, the Court held that a
strike violates a collective bargaining agreement if the strike is over an issue
that the agreement commits to arbitration, regardless of the absence of a no-
strike pledge. 28
 The Court thus broadened its policy that an agreement to ar-
bitrate effectively precludes the possibility of strikes to mean that a union's ac-
ceptance of arbitration implies an enforceable promise not to strike.
One more result, necessary for compulsory arbitration to avoid strikes,"
came in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770. 3° In Boys Markets, the
Court ruled that federal, not only state, courts could enjoin a strike conducted
in violation of a no-strike clause." The Court held that section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act" (NLGA) did not preclude federal courts from enjoining such
strikes." Section 4 of the NLGA, the Court said, responded to a period of
" Id. at 582.
24 Id. at 582-83, 584-85.
23
 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962).
26 Id. at 101-02. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the
Court held that state courts have jurisdiction, concurrently with federal courts, to hear suits aris-
ing out of disputes over the construction of a collective bargaining agreement. 368 U.S. at
508-14.
" Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
28 Id. at 104-05.
29
 The law through Lincoln Mills, Steelworkers Trilogy, Charles Dowd Box Co., and Lucas
Flour required all courts in the United States to order arbitration of an arbitrable grievance, and
virtually required courts to enforce an arbitrator's award. Although these requirements would
likely deter strikes over grievances, since employers suffer from a strike, the Court had not yet
decided to prevent strikers forcefully.
Indeed, until 1970 an anomolous situation existed. State courts could, so far as federal
law was concerned, enjoin strikers. Federal courts could not enjoin strikers because in Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court reaffirmed the position that 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. 5 104 (1976), prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions
as a remedy for the employer in a suit that alleged that a strike breached the collective bargaining
agreement. 370 U.S. at 199, 203, 215. Although the employer could sue in state court, the union
could remove to federal court. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). A
union would always be tempted to remove, to avoid an injunction. This situation created two
problems. First, only one half of the arbitration/no-strike policy was enforceable. Second, an un-
necessarily large percentage of these lawsuits would be litigatged in federal court. At some point
the problems had to be solved, either by overruling Sinclair, or by extending the prohibitions on
injunctions to state courts, as a matter of federal common law under Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour.
See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247 (1970).
'° 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruling, Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
31 398 U.S. at 238, 253-55.
" 29 U.S.C. 5 104 (1976).
33 398 U.S. at 253.
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history when labor unions were much less organized and powerful than they
are today. 34 The Court concluded that the appropriate policy to pursue with
modern unionized labor, which is powerful enough to compel 'employers to
make collective bargaining agreements, was a policy that would encourage
peaceful settlement of disputes arising out of such contracts and would curtail
or eliminate the disruption of production and commerce. 35 For that reason,
binding arbitration became the union's and society's tool to settle grievances
while the injunction of a strike became the employer's and society's remedy for
interruptions of production.
The only lapses in the Court's enforcement of no-strike clauses came in
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board," and Buffalo Forge Company
v. United Steelworkers of America." In Mastro Plastics, a relatively early decision,
the Court refused to enforce a no-strike clause on the ground that it applied on-
ly to disputes about normal, not extraordinary, events in the operations of the
employer. Finding that the strike at issue resulted from an extraordinary
event, 38 the Court refused to grant the employer an injunction, damages or an
arbitration order. 39 Mastro Plastics' continued vitality is doubtful, however,
because it preceded the Court's decisions in Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers'
Trilogy, and Boys Markets. Furthermore, Mastro Plastics was not a suit for breach
of contract but rather an unfair labor practice proceeding that required con-
struction of a provision of the National Labor Relations Act." The case's ap-
plicability to claims disputing contractual rights is thus minimal because the
latter arise under the federal common law announced in Lincoln Mills.
The other occasion in which the Court diverged from its policy of enforc-
ing contractual no-strike clauses was Buffalo Forge Company v. United Steelworkers
of America. 4 ' In Buffalo Forge, the Court refused to enjoin a sympathy strike by
one group of employees who refused to cross the picket lines of another group
of employees.'" The contract invoked by the plaintiff in Buffalo Forge une-
quivocally provided that disputes about the application of the no-strike clause
were to be submitted to arbitration." The district court, however, had con-
" Id. at 250-51.
33 Id. at 251-53.
36 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
" 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
38 350 U.S. at 281-84.
39 id. at 278-79, 284.
4° In Mastro Plastics the union struck during the 60-day cooling-off period immediately
prior to expiration of the existing contract. Id. at 274-75. See National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 8(d)(4), 29 U.S.C. 158(d)(4) (1976). The strike was called, however, to protest the
employer's alleged unfair labor practices, not to exert pressure during the critical period before
negotiations. 350 U.S. at 273. The Court held that the no-strike clause in the collective bargain-
ing agreement was not intended to apply to strikes over unfair labor practices, id. at 281-84, and
also that the statutory proscription did not apply to unfair labor practice strikes. Id. at 286.
428 U.S. 397 (1976).
42 Id. at 400-01, 403-04.
4 ' Id. at 400. The arbitration/no-strike clause encompassed "differences „ . between
the [employer] and any employee covered by this Agreement as to the meaning and application
of the provisions of this Agreement, [and] trouble of any kind .. in the plant." Id.
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eluded that neither the causes of the sympathy strike nor the issues underlying
it were subject to the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement." The parties to the dispute had stipulated to the correctness of that
finding." The question before the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether an
injunction, as opposed to damages, would be warranted if the sympathy strike
violated a no-strike provision, but did not breach the arbitration provisions of
the agreement." The Court denied the injunction, 47 thus refusing to extend the
power granted to the federal courts in Boys Markets. Under Buffalo  Forge, then, a
strike may not be enjoined pending arbitration of the propriety of the strike
when the district or appellate court finds that neither the causes of nor the issue
underlying the strike is subject to the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement."
The foregoing discussion shows that in the past twenty years, the Supreme
Court has developed an aggressive policy of favoring arbitration and minimiz-
ing strikes. The powers of arbitrators have been broadened and their rulings
subject to very narrow judicial review. Employers have been allowed to seek in-
junctions in federal, as well as state, courts to prevent strikes over issues that
are properly submittable to arbitration. In only one instance has the Court
refused to grant an injunction against a strike arguably conducted in disregard
of an agreement to arbitrate, and even this exception may include only strikes
where the validity of the strike is subject to arbitration — not the issues
underlying or causing it — and where the employees have agreed to submit to
arbitration on that issue. Otherwise, the Court has adhered steadfastly to the
notion that the disruption of production should be minimized while arbitration
should be encouraged.
B. Safety as a Justification for Refusal to Work
The judicial policy of eliminating, within the limits imposed by contract,
any disruption of production during the resolution of employer/employee
disputes was destined to conflict with another social goal — promoting safety in
the workplace. The full impact of the continuous production policy upon socie-
ty's interest in safe working conditions has not yet been resolved, but some
conflicts have emerged. Although four sources of law have been relied upon
from time to time to justify a refusal to work based on unsafe conditions," the
impending conflict exists because of the Supreme Court's construction of sec-
44 Id. at 402-03.
45 Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
" Id.
48 Id. at 406-09.
49 Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1976), discussed in text at notes 120-27 in-
fra; 5 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976), discussed
in text at notes 54-81 infra; 5 110(b) of the MSHA, 30 U.S.C. 5 815(c)(1) (Supp. HI 1979),
discussed in text at notes 129-42 infra; 5 11(c)(1) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. 660(c)(1) (1976), and the
accompanying regulation, 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.12 (1980), discussed in text at notes 82-119 infra.
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Lion 502 of the LMRA5° and the Court's approval of the OSHA regulation."
Accordingly, this article will concentrate on section 502 and the OSHA regula-
tion. The other two sources of employee-safety legislation, section 7 of the
Wagner Act 52 and section 110(6) of the MSHA, 53 will be discussed to illustrate
the depth of judicial concern about safety and to complete the picture of safety
justifications for refusal to work. An analysis of section 7 of the Wagner Act
and section 110(b) of the MSHA will also demonstrate that judicial and ad-
ministrative constructions of these statutes support the thesis of this article —
that subjective evidence of a health hazard should be sufficient, under the
OSHA regulation, to justify an employee's refusal to work.
1. Section 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act
and Refusals to Work
Section 502 of the LMRA" provides that the definition of strike in the act
does not include the quitting of labor by one or more employees in good faith
due to abnormally dangerous work conditions. The major effect of section 502
is to exempt from punitive employer treatment an employee who stops working
in accordance with the statutory requirements. 55 Before 1973, the Labor Board
and the few circuit courts of appeals that construed section 502 did not link con-
struction of that provision with the Supreme Court's expansive role for arbitra-
tion and narrow role for strikes. While the courts and the Board dealt with
issues of construction which could further or curb the Court's policies, the
opinions do not suggest that the adjudicators were aware of that possible effect
of their decisions. These decisions focused on two questions. First, the courts
and the Board considered whether the words "good faith" in section 502
meant that the employee's belief that a condition was abnormally dangerous
had to be only reasonable, or whether the employee's belief had to be objective-
ly correct. 56
 Second, the adjudicatory bodies also considered whether the
'° 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976), construed in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974).
5' 29 C .F.R. $ 1977.12 (1980). See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
52 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
" 30 U.S.C.	 815(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
" 29 U.S.C. 5 143 (1976). The statute says: " . . nor shall the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the
place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter."
" Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974).
56 Knight-Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Knight-
Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied sub nom. Knight-Morley Corp. v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 927 (1958), was the first significant case to construe 5 502. In that case, the air blowers
in the plant worked in reverse, scattering hot air and dust around the room and into workers'
eyes, and creating a great deal of heat. 251 F.2d at 756. The employees left after working briefly
under those conditions, and the employer refused to admit them to work the next day. Id. The
collective bargaining agreement contained a general no-strike clause. Id. at 759. An expert
witness testified that the conditions in the plant could cause a variety of serious physical dif-
ficulties. 16 N.L.R.B. at 142-43. The Board held that $ 502 protected the walk-off. Id. at 145-47.
The opinion, however, relied on both the expert witness' testimony that the conditions were
hazardous, and the testimony of the employees that they thought the conditions were unsafe. Id.
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phrase "abnormally dangerous" meant abnormally dangerous in an abstract
sense, or abnormally dangerous for the particular job involved." Thus the
question of whether to use objective or subjective standards to construe safety
statutes arose early in the application of those protections. The same question
at 142-44. In a concurring opinion, Member Rogers wrote that only objective evidence of abnor-
mally dangerous conditions, here the expert's testimony, could suffice to invoke $ 502. Id. at
154-55. The employees' perceptions were not, he thought, relevant. Id. The opinion of the Sixth
Circuit, enforcing the Board's orders, relied almost entirely on the objective evidence. 251 F.2d
at 758-59.
Although Knight-Morley has sometimes been cited to show that 5 502 requires only sub-
jective evidence, it has been cited more often to support the theory that 502 requires objective
evidence. Compare J. Attleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59
MINN. L. REV. 647, 686-88 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Attleson] with NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon
Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964) (discussed infra at note 57). See Attleson, supra, at
nn. 207-08.
In Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), enforced as modified sub nom.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers, Local Union No. 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), a truckloader refused to cross a picket line of other
employees, alleging fear of violence and harassment: A union represented the truckloaders, but
there was neither a collective bargaining agreement nor a no-strike clause. See 130 N.L.R.B.
1208 (compare discussion of rights under 7 of the Wagner Act at text at notes 120-27 infra). The
Board ruled that conditions were not abnormally dangerous, because other truckloaders had per-
formed the work without difficulty. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1210-11. The Board wrote, however, that
for that reason it need not decide whether 5 502 could protect the truckloaders. Id. at 1209. It is
one thing to say that the absence of abnormally dangerous conditions means that 5 502 does not
apply; it is quite another to say that the absence of such conditions means that one need not
decide whether 5 502 applies. The Board may have been confused about the roles of objective and
subjective evidence in 5 502 cases. That the Board's opinion in Redwing reads much like the
Knight-Morley concurrence strengthens that possibility, as does the absence of a concurring opi-
nion by Member Rogers in Redwing. Furthermore, two years after Redwing, the Board ruled, in
Curtis-Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N. L. R. B. 473 (1963), that the employees' perception of danger
lacked a sufficient foundation in objective fact. Id. at 475 n.4. Member Leedom, a member of the
Knight-Morley majority, and perhaps its author (the Board's opinions do not ascribe authorship),
concurred specially, saying that he would apply 5 502 solely on the basis of the employees'
perceptions. Id. Redwing and Curtis-Mathes thus suggest that the Board was moving toward an ob-
jective evidence definition for the statute's phrase "good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions." Accord NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964) (re-
quiring objective evidence, and reading the Sixth Circuit opinion in Knight-Morley, to require
such evidence).
" In Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894 (1962), enforcement denied sub nom.
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964), the job was to place
dynamite charges in a mountain. 139 N.L.R.B. at 896. The employees left the job one day,
claiming that it was extremely cold, and that the ladders they used were slippery from ice. Id. at
897-98. The Board held these conditions to be abnormally dangerous within the meaning of
502, id. at 894, 904-05 (adopting findings of Trial Examination), but the court of appeals revers-
ed. 330 F.2d at 891-92. The court said that the job was dangerous by nature, that the workers
were paid an additional wage for that reason, and that there was insufficient evidence that condi-
tions were abnormally dangerous given that the job was fairly dangerous in any event. 330 F.2d
at 891.
The Board agreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Fruin-Colnon when the Board
decided Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336 (1972). The workers in Anaconda refused
to pull pins on detonators, claiming that their proximity to and the frequency of explosion were
dangerous. Id. at 341-42. The Board cited Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961),
enforced as modified sub nom. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Locan Union No. 79 v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), and Fruin-Colnon, supra for the
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has blossomed to create the potential conflict between OSHA and the
arbitration/no-strike policy. 58
While the early decisions concerning section 502 did not directly address
the conflict between the policies of promoting arbitration and protecting
worker safety, in 1973, in Gateway Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 59
 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted the issue head-on, only to be
reversed by the Supreme Court." In Gateway Coal, the union told its men to
stop working because of an alleged fear of unsafe conditions, based on the con-
tinued presence of foremen who had falsified air flow records." The company
offered to arbitrate, but the union refused." The company then sought to en-
join the strike on the ground that the union had struck over an arbitrable
issue.'" The district court granted the injunction, but also suspended the
foremen pending arbitration." On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed." The
court recognized the importance of the national policy favoring arbitration"
but concluded that the arbitration agreement involved in Gateway Coal, which
did not contain express provisions regarding safety, 67 should not be construed
to include safety complaints when balancing the policy of promoting arbitra-
tion against that of protecting worker safety." The court of appeals read earlier
decisions interpreting section 502 to establish that a " . good faith apprehen-
sion of physical danger is protected activity and not enjoinable, even where the
employees have subscribed to a comprehensive no-strike clause in their labor
contract. "69
 Although the court did not offer any definition of the term "good
faith," its reasoning suggests that the employees' perceptions of danger would
suffice if reasonable, even if evidence did not prove those perceptions to be ac-
curate.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals" on a variety of
grounds. First, the Court ruled that the arbitration clause in the workers' col-
proposition that a condition is not abnormally dangerous unless the degree of danger is extraor-
dinary for the work involved. 197 N.L.R.B. at 343-44.
After the decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S.
368 (1974), discussed in text at notes 59-81 infra, however, the NLRB General Counsel's office
took the position that the term "serving violation" in OSHA is broader than the phrase "abnor-
mally dangerous" in S 502. Economy Tank Line, [1978-791 NLRB DEC. (CCH) 41 20,223 at
33,389-90 (July 31, 1978). Although binding on virtually nobody, the position of the General
Counsel's office suggests that OSHA may be held to provide more protection than S 502.
" See text at notes 11-14 supra.
59 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972), reu'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
69 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
61 Id. at 371.
62 Id. at 372.
61 Id.
" Id. at 372, 73.
65
 466 F.2d 1157, 1161 (3d Cir. 1972), reu'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
66
 466 F.2d at 1159.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1160.
69 Id.
7° 414 U.S. 368, 388 (1974).
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lective bargaining agreement encompassed disputes about safety. 7 ' In so con-
cluding, the Court rejected the Third Circuit's reference to a public policy that
militated against arbitration of safety disputes." The Court reasoned that all of
the policies favoring arbitration, such as avoiding industrial strife, were as ap-
plicable to safety disputes as to any other disagreements." The Court found
unpersuasive the court of appeals' contention that an arbitrator would be in-
sensitive to the workers' interest in their safety:74
The Court also rejected the appeal's court's refusal to uphold an injunc-
tion of the employees' strike." Relying upon the model it had created in earlier
eases," the Court reasoned that absent an explicit expression of an intention , to
negate a no-strike obligation, "the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to
strike should be construed as having coterminous application."" Thus, in
Gateway Coal, a duty not to strike existed because, in the Court's view, safety
disputes were proper subjects for arbitration under the contract.
Turning to the effect that section 502 of the LMRA had on the dispute,
the Court ruled that the provision furnished only a narrow exception to the im-
plied no-strike obligation in the workers' collective bargaining agreement."
The Court agreed with the court of appeals that section 502 provides a limited
exception to an express or implied no-strike obligation, but ruled that the ex-
ception did not apply unless the employees presented objective evidence of an
abnormally dangerous condition." The Court weighed the desirability of ar-
bitration against the policy of promoting safety in the workplace by stating:
"Absent the most explicit statutory command, we are unwilling to conclude
that Congress intended the public policy favoring arbitration and peaceful
resolution of labor disputes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as sub-
jective judgment, however honest it may be."" Thus, the Court in Gateway
Coal held that where safety conditions are determined to be arbitrable under
the employment contract, section 502 is not a defense for an employee who
stops working unless the employee presents objective evidence of abnormally
dangerous conditions. The Court did not consider, however, the rights and
duties of an employee not subject to a collective bargaining agreement contain-
ing an arbitration clause."
In summary, the Supreme Court decided in Gateway Coal that the
judicially-created policy of favoring arbitration was as applicable to safety
disputes as to any other labor disagreement. The Court also concluded that
71 Id. at 376-80.
73 Id. at 376.
73 Id. at 377-80.
74 Id. at 379.
75 Id. at 380-88.
76 Id. at 380-82.
77 Id. at 382.
78 Id. at 385-87.
79 Id. at 386-87.
89 Id. at 386.
81 For a discussion on this problem, see text at notes 120-27 infra.
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where employees strike in violation of an agreement to arbitrate and there is an
express or implied no-strike clause, the panoply of remedies available to
employers, in particular injunctive relief, would also apply to safety disputes.
Thus, the Court deemed the policy of preventing the disruption of production
more important than an employee's honestly held fear of unsafe conditions to
justify a refusal to work, where the safety defense was based on section 502.
2. The Occupational Safety and Health Act and Refusals to Work
OSHA prohibits any employer from discharging or discriminating against
any employee who exercises "any right afforded by" the statute." In 1973, the
Secretary of Labor issued a regulation providing that among the rights that the
statute protects is, after stated qualifications, the right of an employee to refuse
work on the ground that a hazardous condition exists, and to suffer no adverse
employment consequences from exercising that right. 83 Under this regulation,
a reasonable, subjective belief — not objective evidence — of unsafe conditions
triggers the employee's privilege to refuse work." Thus, the employee's protec-
tion under the OSHA regulation is broader than protection under section 502,
since the Supreme Court interpreted the latter to require objective evidence
that danger existed." Recently, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 86 the Supreme
Court upheld the Secretary's power to issue this regulation. The Court's opin-
ion in Whirlpool does not directly address the relationship of the OSHA regula-
tion to the policy of favoring arbitration and preventing strikes. Nevertheless,
the Court's reasoning, as well as its endorsement of the regulation, accentuates
the emerging conflict between the Court's policy of encouraging continued
production and the congressional goal of promoting safety in the workplace.
In Whirlpool, an employer told employees who had refused to perform cer-
tain tasks because of dangerous conditions to leave work for the remainder of
their shift." The employer issued written reprimands that were subsequently
placed in the employees' files." The Secretary of Labor sued to expunge the
records, and to recover pay for the lost time. 89 Although the employees might
have used section 502 as a defense, none of the opinions rendered in the case
suggests that they did so. The district court denied relief, holding that the
Secretary's regulation was invalid because it was inconsistent with the Act. 9°
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed," finding the regulation
82 29 U.S.C. $ 660(c)(1) (1976).
83 29 C.F.R. 5 1977,12 (1980). See note 11 supra for text of the OSHA regulation.
" See note 12 supra.
" See discussion in text at notes 70-81 supra, especially at notes 79-80 supra.
86 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
" Id. at 7.
88 Id.
89 Usery v, Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30, 31 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
Id. at 33.
91
 Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub non. Whirlpool
Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
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within the scope of OSHA," and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of ap-
peals. 93
The Supreme Court first concluded that the regulation was reasonably
related to the Act's fundamental purpose of protecting workers." The Court
emphasized that safety legislation is to be . construed liberally in order to further
congressional intent." The Court then examined the employer's arguments
that the regulation was inconsistent with the legislative history of OSHA. 96
First, the employer argued that Congress had specifically rejected the right
given by the .fegulation. 97 One of the - bills leading to the passage of OSHA
would have entitled workers to leave work and continue to be paid if (1) the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare determined that materials at
the workplace were toxic, (2) sixty days elapsed after such determination, and
(3) the employer failed either to correct the conditions, or to inform the
employee of the hazard, and neglected to furnish the employee with personal
protective equipment." Ultimately this proposal, denounced by opponents as
the strike with pay provision,99 was dropped.'°° Nevertheless, the Court upheld
the OSHA regulation, reasoning that it differed significantly from the strike
with pay provision. The Court noted that "Congress rejected a provision that
did not concern itself at all with conditions posing real and immediate threats of
death or severe injury."'°' Yet the regulation, in the Court's view, is so
qualified as to limit its application to such cases.'" Additionally, the Court
concluded that the opposition to the strike with pay provision arose from its im-
position on employers of an unconditional obligation to continue to pay full
compensation to the non-working employees, and not from the creation of a
right to stop working.'" The Court specifically did not decide whether the
regulation granted a right to pay for the time not worked.'"
92 593 F.2d at 736. The court neither considered nor decided whether the regulation en-
titled the employer to pay for lost time, nor, if it did, whether the statute authorized such a por-
tion of the regulation.
" Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
" Id. at 13.
u Id.
96 Id. at 13-21.
97 Id. at 16-17.
96 Id. at 14-15 (discussing H.R. 16875, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 19(a)(5) (1970), reprinted
in COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1974, at 755-56 (1971)).
" 445 U.S. at 14.
1 " Id. at 16 (discussing S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 1.30 (1971)).
'°' 445 U.S. at 17.
'° 2 Id.
1 " Id. at 17-18.
104 Id. at 19 n.31. The questions of whether an employee whose refusal to work is pro-
tected by the regulation should be paid for lost time is a complex one. Such an inquiry must focus
on the basic issue of how broad is the relief provided by the regulation. A remedy which fails to
treat the employees as though they had worked the whole time would require a detailed statement
of the employer's rights and responsibilities. Decisions would have to be made about fringe
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The Whirlpool Court then examined another portion of the legislative his-
tory which the employer claimed invalidated the OSHA regulation. Two bills,
the Daniels and Williams Bills, originally had contained provisions that would
have granted Labor Department officials the power to shut down temporarily
all or part of an employer's plant. i° 6 The Court reasoned that the deletion of
these provisions did not militate in favor of invalidating the regulation since the
opposition to the provisions was directed at the broad authority they gave to
federal officials to impair the operation of an employer's business.' 06 While it
was thus possible that the omitted provisions might shift the nature of the
government's traditionally neutral role in labor-management relations,'" the
Court reasoned that the OSHA regulation did not raise such concerns because
it accords no authority to government officials.'" The Court explained:
[The regulation] simply permits private employees of a private
employer to avoid workplace conditions that they believe pose grave
dangers to their own safety. The employees have no power under the
regulation to order their employer to correct the hazardous condition
or to clear. the dangerous workplace of others. Moreover, any
employee who acts in reliance on the regulation runs the risk of
discharge or reprimand in the event a court subsequently finds that
he acted unreasonably or in bad faith. The regulation, therefore,
does not remotely resemble the legislation that Congress rejected.'"
Thus, the Court effectively endorsed the right of an employee to stop working,
based upon a reasonable belief of imminent danger, without suffering
employer retribution.
The scope of the Court's decision is, as yet, unknown. Neither the Court's
opinion nor those of the lower courts reveal whether the plant was unionized,
whether a collective bargaining agreement governed employment or, if there
was a collective bargaining agreement, whether it contained an agreement to
arbitrate or a no-strike clause. Given that posture, the application of Whirlpool
to future safety disputes remains uncertain. There are at least three ways in
which the courts could interpret the OSHA regulation. First, courts could con-
clude that the right of an employee to stop working under the regulation applies
only where the collective bargaining agreement does not contain an agreement
to arbitrate."° Second, courts could conclude that the regulation applies in all
situations, providing an exception to a no-strike obligation arising from an
benefits, seniority, and all other incidents of employment related to time actually worked.
," Id. at 19 (discussing H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
	 12(a) (1970) (the Daniels
Bill) and S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., $ 11(b) (1970) (the Williams Bill)).
	 -
'06 445 U.S. at 20-21.
1 ° 7 Id. at 21.
1 ° 8 Id.
109 Id.
"" See discussion in text at notes 154-56 infra.
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agreement to arbitrate."' Finally, the regulation's applicability to a situation
where a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause could
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if particular trades of safety
guarantees for economic benefit in a collective bargaining agreement violate
the purposes and precepts behind OSHA.'"
There is a dearth of authority addressing the scope of the OSHA regula-
tion's application. In particular, sources have not addressed the need to recon-
cile Gateway Coal's objective standard for justifying a refusal to work with the
OSHA regulation's broader approach to the same question. A few
tangentially-related items are suggestive, although scarcely conclusive.
First, two circuits have held that a court may refuse to enforce an ar-
bitrator's award in favor of an employer when the employee later sues over the
same grievance, asserting that either OSHA or MSHA protected his
conduct." 3
 The results and reasoning in these cases suggest that some courts
were willing, even before the Whirlpool decision, to use the safety statutes to
create a hole in the Steelworkers' Trilogy policy of enormous deferences to the
jurisdiction of an arbitrator and the substance of his award. Second, even the
Supreme Court, in Gateway Coal, has agreed that a general no-strike pledge is
insufficient to waive the limited right to refuse work that section 502
provides."4
 Thus, there exists strong authority for the proposition that waiver
of safety protections will not be inferred. Third, the agencies that administer
the relevant statutes — the NLRB and the OSH Administration — have
agreed that in cases where the jurisdictions of the two agencies overlap, the
jurisdiction of the OSH Administration is primary.'" This arrangement sug-
"' This interpretation would have the effect of virtually dispensing with the Gateway Coal
objective evidence limitation because $ 502 would apply only where OSHA, or a similarly con-
strued statute, did not apply. See discussion in text at notes 150-82 infra.
117
 See discussion in text at notes 194-95 infra.
1 " Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 777, 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (arbitration board held itself without authority to apply federal mine safety act); N.L.
Indus., [1980] OSHA DEC. (CCH) 24,354, at 29,689-90 (7th Cir. 1980). Accord, Brennan v.
Alan Wood Steel Co., [1975-76] OSHA DEC. (CCH))11 20,136, at 23,958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In
Marshall v. General Motors, 6 OSHC 1200 (BNA) (N.D. Ohio 1977), the court refused to in-
quire behind an arbitrator's award, but on the ground that the award was made by the consent of
both parties and therefore operated as a waiver of the employee's right to bring suit under
OSHA. Id. at 1201, 1203. The decision in Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 464 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972), holding that a coal mine safety dispute was subject to ar-
bitration, id. at 569, is not to the contrary because the Hanna opinion did not discuss implications
of the safety act.
114 414 U.S. at 385.
1 " 29 C.F.R. 5 1977.13 (1980). A nearly identical agreement exists between the NLRB
and MSHA. 45 Fed. Reg. 6189 (Jan. 25, 1980); [1979-80 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY &
HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11,886.
In addition, the Secretary of Labor was instructed to report to Congress regarding
overlapping jurisdiction between the NLRB and the OSH Administration. 29 U.S.C.
653(b)(3) (1976). In 1975 the Secretary seems to have reported that no legislation was required to
work out interagency overlapping jurisdiction. [1974-75] EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE
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Bests that the protection offered by OSHA is paramount to that of the NLRA.
Hence, the limitations placed on the NLRB in its administration of statutes
such as section 502 of the LMRA might not bind the OSH Administration.
Further support for the proposition that the administration of OSHA is to re-
main distinct from, and indeed, in some aspects, superior to that of the NLRA,
can be found in a recent district court decision. In Newport News Shipbuilding and
Drydock Co. v. Marshall, the court held that the OSH Administration should not
defer to NLRB proceedings," 6 and that OSHA required the Secretary of
Labor to bring suit on behalf of a complaining employee, promptly and
without delaying the remedy.'"
Although no one of these developments even approaches strong authority
regarding the scope of applicability of the OSHA regulations, taken as a whole
they suggest that the courts and the agencies may be inclined to give the regula-
tion broad application — broader at least than the Court allowed for section
502 in Gateway Coal. They at least show that the policy the Court followed in
Gateway Coal under section 502 may be modified in cases brought under the
OSHA regulation. Since the Supreme Court endorsed one policy in Gateway
Coal and an arguably different one in Whirlpool, some choice or accommodation
will have to be made to reconcile the two positions. An examination of the ways
in which section 7 of the Wagner Act" 8
 and section 110(b) of the MSHA'"
have been used to justify refusals to work for safety reasons will supply a useful
background for a discussion of the choice or accommodation that must be made
between Gateway Coal and the OSHA regulation. Cases decided under both of
those sections shed light on the kind of accommodation that should be made
between the Court's construction of section 502 in Gateway Coal, requiring ob-
jective proof that conditions were in fact unsafe, and the apparent meaning of
the OSHA regulation, requiring only that the employee's subjective belief that
conditions were unsafe was reasonable.
3. Section 7 of the Wagner Act and Refusal to Work for Safety Reasons
Section 7 of the Wagner Act'n gives employees the right to engage in con-
certed activity for mutual aid and protection. Sections 8(a)(1)' 2 ' and 8(a)(3) 122
enforce those rights. Before OSHA existed and, therefore, long before the
(CCH) T 9789 (reporting draft report). 29 U.S.C. 653(b)(1) (1976), however, excludes applica-
tion of OSHA to employment conditions "with respect to which other Federal agencies ... exer-
cise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce" safety and health standards. Id. Although this
might mean that any overlap with 502 must be resolved against OSHA jurisdiction, none of the
agencies involved have taken that position.
1 " Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Marshall, [1980] OSHA DEC.
(CCH) 124,510 at 29,969 (F.D. Va. 1980).
117 Id.
"a 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
"9 30 U.S.C. S 815(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
120 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
121 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1976).
122 29 U.S.C. $ 158(a)(3) (1976).
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Whirlpool decision, the Supreme Court held that a refusal to work because of
unsafe working conditions is an activity that section 7 embraces, unless the
refusal violates a collective bargaining agreement.' 23
 The Labor Board subse-
quently construed the scope of that section 7 right broadly, holding that a single
worker's activity could satisfy the "concerted" requirement of the statute.'"
Furthermore ., the Board ruled that a genuinely held fear of unsafe conditions
was sufficient to invoke the protection of section 7, regardless not only of
whether the conditions were in fact unsafe, but also regardless of whether the
employees' belief was reasonable.' 25
The protection afforded by section 7 is limited to cases in which there is no
collective bargaining agreement. The provision, therefore, does not conflict
with Gateway Coal's policy of encouraging arbitration and enjoining strikes over
all grievances that are arguably required to be arbitrated under a collective
bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, the Board's interpretation of section 7
suggests a dissatisfaction with the Court's policy regarding an employee's
refusal to work for safety reasons. The decisions evidence a reluctance to apply
the Court's policy as broadly as possible, and a desire to use legislation to cut
into the broad sweep that the Court's policy could have been given. Without
pretending that a direct analogy exists between unorganized labor acting under
section 7 and organized labor relying on the OSHA regulations, the broad use
of section 7 to protect workers who refuse to work due to alleged unsafe condi-
tions suggests that the courts might use the OSHA regulation — drafted ex-
plicitly to protect employee safety — in a manner which avoids the results of
the Supreme Court's construction of section 502.
To construe the OSHA regulation as more protective of employee safety
than section 502 does not require any unfaithfulness to Gateway Coal. That case
construed only section 502. Any court faced with construction of the OSHA
regulation can legitimately claim to be construing a different piece of legisla-
tion. Since the union in Gateway Coal relied only on section 502, Gateway Coal is
not necessarily dispositive authority in cases that invoke another statute, or ad-
ministrative interpretation. Even the Supreme Court can take that position,
because the Court would not itself be construing a statute, as it had to in
Gateway Coal. Instead, the Court would rely upon the presumptively correct
position of the Secretary of Labor,' 26 the official charged with construing the
congressional intent in enacting OSHA. Such an analysis would support a
123
 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1962). Accord, Union Boiler
Co. v. NLRB, [1975.76] OSHA DEC. (CCH) i 20,135, at 23,957 (4th Cir. 1975); American
Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 875, 875-76 (1972).
I " Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000-01 (1975).
1 " Modern Carpets Indus., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1015 (1978), enforced sub nom.
NLRB v. Modern Carpet Indus., Inc., 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
In both Alleluia Cushion, supra note 124, and Modern Carpets, supra the foundation of the
opinions was the Board's judgment that safety statutes had to be enforced, and that they could
not be enforced unless safety complainants, usually employees, know that their jobs will be pro-
tected. Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000-01; Modern Carpets, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1015-16.
126 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980).
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decision that produces results contrary to Gateway Coal. Approval of the OSHA
regulation in Whirlpool might have been a first step in that direction, although
the ambiguous nature of certain facts in that case prevents conclusive
generalizations from being drawn.'"
4. Section 110(b) of the Mine Safety and Health Act
The MSHA is similar to OSHA in the protections which it offers workers
covered by the statute. MSHA, however, regulates the mining industry,'"
while OSHA exempts mining operations from its coverage.'" The Secretary of
the Interior, in whom enforcement of MSHA is vested, has not issued a regula-
tion similar to the OSHA regulation that was the subject of Whirlpool. There is,
therefore, no explicit statutory or agency-created right to refuse work for safety
reasons in the mining industry, and no court has yet addressed that precise
issue. ' 3 ° Section 110(b) of the Act,''' however, a provision virtually identical to
section 11(c)(1) of OSHA' 32 under which the OSHA regulation was pro-
mulgated, prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee who
invokes the protections of the Act.'" The handful of cases that have arisen
127 See text and'notes at notes 109-12 supra. Although none of the opinions mentions the
possibility, it seems likely that the employees in Whirlpool could have succeeded under 502 even
as construed in Gateway Coal. The employees' jobs required them to climb onto a steel mesh
screen twenty feet above the floor. Several months before the employees in the case refused to
work, a number of employees had fallen partly through the screen, and one had fallen all the way
through. Ten days before the incident that led to the case, an employee had fallen through and
died. 445 U.S. at 5.
The facts suggest that the work conditions in Whirlpool would have been found abnor-
mally dangerous under 5 502 even as the Supreme Court construed those words in Gateway Coal.
Only if 5 502 requires expert testimony are the facts insufficient. Such a requirement is unlikely
and, in any event, could probably have been met in Whirlpool.
''s 30 U.S.C. S 801(g) (1976).
' 29 29 U.S.C. 653(b)(1) (1976) ("other Federal agencies").
13° In Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom.
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), however, the court of appeals wrote that it
would be free on its own, as a matter of statutory construction, to give employees the rights that
the OSHA regulation provides. 593 F.2d at 725. In so stating, the court cited with approval and
as an analogy Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Kentucky Carbon Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
420 U.S. 938 (1975), a case that construed the MSHA to broaden protection. Whirlpool, 593 F.2d
at 724-25. See discussion at text and note at note 134 infra. The Supreme Court, affirming in
Whirlpool, made no such statement. See 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
151 30 U.S.C. 815(0(1) (Supp. III 1979).
1 " 29 U.S.C. 5 660(e)(1) (1976).
133 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979) reads as follows:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause to be
discharged or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the exercise
of the statutory rights of any miner, representative of miners or applicant for
employment in any coal or other mine subject to this chapter because such miner,
representative of miners or applicant for employment has filed or made a com-
plaint under or related to this chapter, including a complaint notifying the
operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the miners at the coal or
other mine of an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal or other
mine, or because such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employ-
ment is the subject of medical evaluations and potential transfer under a standard
published pursuant to section 811 of this title or because such miner, represen-
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under the MSHA have presented a series of questions regarding the scope of
section 110(b). The decisions are relevant to the issue of the scope to be accord-
ed the OSHA regulation because, like the section 7 cases, they illustrate lower
court reactions to the result of Gateway Coal's construction of section 502.
In a series of cases decided after Gateway Coal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit successively broadened the ap-
plication of section 110(b). In Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals,' 34
the court held that cases arising under the section are excepted from the re-
quirement of judicial deference to an arbitration award," 5 as set forth in the •
tative of miners or applicant for employment has instituted or caused to be in-
stituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such miner,
representative or miners or applicant for employment on behalf of himself or
others of any statutory right afforded by this chapter.
13 ' 500 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Kentucky Carbon Corp. v. In-
terior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
,9S
	F.2d 775, 776 n.15.
Phillips is an important decision because it broke new ground in the area of employee
safety rights, avoided the result of Gateway Coal, and was later explicitly approved and expanded
by Congress. In Phillips, the employee's complaints to his foreman about safety violations went
unheeded for some time, so he refused to work. 500 F.2d at 774-75. The employer discharged
him, and lengthy litigation began. Id. at 775-76. An arbitrator held that the employee had failed
to show conditions that would justify refusal to work under the contract, and, furthermore, ex-
pressly stated that he was without power to construe Phillips' asserted rights under MSHA. Id. at
776. The employee then filed an unfair labor practice charge against the employer. The regional
director of the NLRB rejected the complaint, ruling that arbitration must precede such
"striking," unless the conditions for relief under § 502 were met, which, in this case, they were
not. Id. Phillips then applied to the Secretary of Interior for a review of his discharge under the
Mine Safety Act. Id. at 777. Although the ALJ ruled for Phillips, the Appeals Board reversed on
the grounds, inter alia, that the protection of the Act does not begin until complaint is made to the
Secretary or his representative, and that the foreman was not the Secretary's representative. Id.
at 777-78.
On appeal, the D.C. circuit reversed the Appeals Board. The court distinguished
Gateway Coal because there the union had not invoked the MSHA. Id. at 776 n.15. The court then
said, in language reminiscent of the Third Circuit in Gateway Coal v. United Mine Workers of
America, 466 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1970), reo'd., 414 U.S. 368 (1974), as well as the
Supreme Court in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281-83 (1955), though it cited
neither, that safety disputes are not ordinary labor disputes because Congress has legislated
specially to create and protect safe working conditions. 500 F.2d at 778. The Phillips court
reasoned that there must be practical means to enforce those statutes, and that workers are in the
best position to initiate enforcement, but that they will do so only if they know that their jobs are
protected. Id. The court then ruled that Phillips' conduct was equivalent to instituting a safety
complaint within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 779.
The history of the 1977 amendments to the MSHA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. III
1979), cited with approval in both Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 735-36 (6th Cir.
1979), aff'd sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), and Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. I, 13, n.18 (1980), shows that Congress approved of the Phillips decision. See
notes 138-40 infra. The Senate Report, S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977),
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & All. NEWS 3401, specifically approves, to the point of vir-
tually enacting into law, both Phillips and Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202, 1209-11 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Munsey I):
This section [30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(G) (Supp. III 1979)] is intended to give miners,
their representatives, and applicants, the right to refuse to work in conditions they
believe to be unsafe or unhealthful and to refuse to comply if their employers order
them to violate a safety and health standard promulgated under the law. The
Committee intends to insure the continuing vitality of the various judicial
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Steelworkers' Trilogy.'" The Phillips court also held that an employee's complaint
to a supervisor brings a case within the meaning of the statute, rejecting the
view that the act was triggered only upon the institution of a formal proceeding
with the Secretary or his representative.'" In Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety and
interpretations of section 110 of 'the Coal Act which are consisterib with the broad
protections of the bill's provisions; See, e.g., Phillips v. IBMA, 500 F.2d 772; Munsey
v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202.
S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in j1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3401, 3436. The language of the Senate bill gave broader protection than did that of the House
bill in the relevant section and the Conference Committee adopted the Senate language. H.R.
CON. REP No. 95-655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1977) reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
Al), NEWS 3485, 3499. The language of the Senate report is therefore sound authority for con-
struction of the legislation in Phillips.
In addition, language on the floors of both houses supports the proposition that Congress
meant strongly to endorse, at a minimum, Phillips, Munsey I, and cases cited at notes 138-40 infra.
The following exchange took place in the Senate:
Mr. CHURCH: I wonder if the distinguished chairman would be good
enough to clarify a point concerning section 106(c), the discrimination clause.
It is my impression that the purpose of this section is to insure that miners will
play an active role in the enforcement of the act by protecting them against any
possible discrimination which they might suffer as a result of their actions to afford
themselves of the protection of the act.
It seems to me that this goal cannot be achieved unless miners faced with con-
ditions that they believe threaten their safety or health have the right to refuse to
work without fear of reprisal. Does the committee contemplate that such a right
would be afforded under this section?
Mr. WILLIAMS: The committee intends that miners not be faced with the
Hobson's choice of deciding between their safety and health or their jobs.
The right to refuse work under conditions that a miner believes in good faith
to threaten his health and safety is essential if this act is to achieve its goal of a safe
and healthful workplace for all miners.
Mr. JAVITS: I think the chairman has succinctly presented the thinking of
the committee on this matter. Without such a right, workers acting in good faith
would not be able to afford themselves their rights under the full protection of the
act as responsible human beings.
123 CONG. REC. S10287-88 (daily ed. June 21, 1977).
In the House, one member referred specifically to the Board's decision in Baker v. North
American Coal Co., 8 IBMA 164 (1977), see note 140 infra, stating that the legislation was
designed to eliminate that and similar narrow constructions of the act:
If miners are to invoke their rights and to enforce the act as we intend, they must
be protected from retaliation. In the past, administrative rulings of the Depart-
ment of the Interior have improperly denied the miner the rights Congress intend-
ed. For example, Baker v. North American Coal Co. , 8 IBMA 164 (1977) held that a
miner who refused to work because he had a good faith belief that his life was in
danger was not protected from retaliation because the miner has no "intent" to
notify the Secretary. This legislation will wipe out such restrictive interpretations
of the safety discrimination provision and will insure that they do not recur.
123 CONG. REC. 35410 (Remarks of Rep. Perkins).
The Whirlpool court of appeals wrote: "[Ojur review of the floor debate reveals no con-
troversy whatsoever on . the discrimination provision] issue, although other provisions of the
Act were heatedly debated. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 736 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd
sub nom. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 V.S. 1 (1980).
135
 See text and notes at notes 20.29 supra.
I"
 Phillips, 500 F.2d at 779. The court decided that in the circumstances of the case, the
foreman was, as a matter of statutory construction, the equivalent of the Secretary's represen-
tative. Id.
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Health Commission (Munsey 11), 135 the court ruled that the statute does not pro-
tect only those complaints later found by a judge to be non-frivolous and in
good faith, but, rather, protects all cornplaints. 139 Simultaneously, the court
decided that the statute's protection exists even if a judge later finds that the
complaining employee never intended to pursue the complaint.'"
These cases show that at least one important court has elected to construe
section 110(b) broadly, despite the availability of a reasonable, narrow con-
struction, 141
 and despite the fact that such a broad construction produces
results that protect employees more than the Gateway Coal decision would have
encouraged. Administrative action also bolsters the conclusion that the MSHA
has been used to avoid the implications of Gateway Coal. The MSH Administra-
tion and the Labor Board have agreed that enforcement of safety complaints
through the MSHA has priority over enforcement of such complaints through
the Labor Act,' 42 the statute interpreted in Gateway Coal. This agreement sug-
gests that the view of the two agencies is that protection under MSHA,
whatever its scope, should not be subordinated to the policies that have led to
narrow construction of section 502.
Taken together, decisions and other developments under section 110(b) of
the MSHA and section 7 of the Wagner Act show a reluctance to place safety
grievances in the same category as other employee complaints. Of course,
Gateway Coal, construing section 502, promises different treatment for some
safety grievances too, but decisions under the other statutes, including Whirl-
pool, show an impetus to protect employees to a significantly greater extent
than Gateway Coal would allow. Although various devices have been used, there
has been a consistent theme underlying the actions of courts and agencies im-
plementing the safety statutes — an unwillingness to subject employees to the
narrow right to refuse work that Gateway Coal would allow, if its policies were
extended to embrace construction of other statutes, would have provided.
III. SUGGESTED SCOPE OF THE OSHA REGULATION
In Gateway Coal, the Supreme Court, construing section 502 of the
LMRA, held that the policy of encouraging arbitration to settle disputes and
the concomitant use of injunctions to prevent strikes that violate an arbitration
agreement, mean that an employee may refuse to work only if he can prove
138 Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 595 F.2d 735, 742-43 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (Munsey See also Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202, 1208 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(Munsey I, on remand, Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Co., 34 Interior Dec. 336 (1977), rev'd,
Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 595 F.2d 735, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19 595 F.2d at 742-43.
140 Baker v. United States Dept. of Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 595 F.2d
746, 748-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141 Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Robb, J., dissenting).
14 ' 45 Fed. Reg. 6189 (Jan. 25, 1980); [1979-80 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY &
HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 11,886.
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that his fears of unsafe conditions were accurate.'" Proof that the employee's
fears were reasonable will not suffice.'" The Court did not pretend to rest its
result on the plain meaning of section 502, nor on the legislative history of that
section. Gateway Coal, is, as the opinion makes clear, an extension of a Court-
created policy, 145 operating under a Court-created mandate to fashion labor
policy.'" While the case leaves some protection pursuant to section 502, it
seems to have preserved as little of that protection as possible. Since the basis of
the decision is the Court-created policy, one might assume that the Court
would apply the same policy, whenever possible, to other sources of law that
allow safety concerns to justify a refusal to work.
By upholding the OSHA regulation in Whirlpool, however, the Court has
set the stage for a re-evaluation of the policy underlying Gateway Coal. It is sub-
mitted that an analysis of case law developed under statutes other than section
502, combined with a number of policy concerns that are ill-served by Gateway
Coal, militate in faVor of reading the OSHA regulations to grant employees a
right to refuse to work if they reasonably believe conditions to be dangerous,
regardless of (1) a general no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, or (2) a clause in the collective bargaining agreement specifically waiv-
ing, even if for stated consideration, the right not to work for fear of unsafe con-
ditions. While this application of the regulation may conflict with the premises
underlying Gateway Coal, it advances the policies of OSHA.
Gateway Coal enforces the judicially-developed labor policy that a strike
over any grievance should be prevented whenever the collective bargaining
agreement can be construed to assign the grievance to arbitration. Arbitration,
under the Gateway Coal view, should settle the problems that provoke strikes —
strikes over arbitrable grievances should be enjoined. In contrast, OSHA
declares its purpose to be to "assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
human resources. ... " 147
 This purpose grew out of Congress' finding that
"personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a
substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms
of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation
payments.'"" Both policies are based on a perception of what is best for the
143 414 U.S. 368, 386-87 (1974).
' 44 Id. at 385-86.
145 Id. at 385-87. Although the Court relied in part on a statute, 203(d) of the LMRA,
29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1976), see 414 U.S. at 377, that statute is not sufficient to support the Court's
decision in Gateway Coal or Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235,
253-55 (1970) that the injunction of strikes is an appropriate remedy for breach of a no-strike
clause. The statute offers even less support for enjoining safety strikes. It simply declares that
labor disputes should be settled by a method to which both parties have agreed. 29 U.S.C.
173(d) (1976). It says nothing about arbitration and nothing about whether an injunction is an
appropriate remedy for breach of either an arbitration agreement or an undertaking not to strike.
1 " See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57
(1977), discussed in text at notes 14-19 supra. See note 145 supra for a discussion of 5 203(d) of the
LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 5 173(d) (1976).
H 7 29 U.S.C. 5 651(b) (1976).
I" 29 U.S.C. 5 651(a) (1976).
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economic condition of the country." 9 More specifically, the Court in Gateway
Coal and Congress in OSHA each thought they were stating and implementing
a policy that would facilitate production and commerce. Similarly, the Court's
approval of the Secretary's regulation in Whirlpool should mean that the Court
believed that the regulation would facilitate production and commerce. At a
minimum, the Court agreed with the Secretary that the regulation was a
reasonable method of increasing production and commerce by decreasing ill-
ness and injury.
The precepts that lie behind Gateway Coal are at odds with those that sup-
port the OSHA regulation, because Gateway Coal, construing section 502, re-
quires evidence that the alleged unsafe condition was in fact unsafe. This ap-
proach reduces the likelihood of strikes and the resulting slowdown of produc-
tion. The OSHA regulation, however, requires only a reasonable belief that
the condition was unsafe. 15° This approach reduces the likelihood of injuries in
the workplace, another burden on the economy. In a proper caset" there will
be head-on conflict between these two approaches, and the Court will have to
149 It could be argued that the OSHA states two or more purposes. Alth6ugh the
language is not explicit, the words of statutory purpose could be read to mean that Congress
wanted to save life and limb for humanitarian purposes. Before conceding the point arguendo, it
should be pointed out that the Act does not explicitly state such a purpose. The Act proposes to
assure every worker a safe workplace, but does not immediately say why such a workplace is
desirable. The Act desires to preserve our human resource, but does not immediately say why we
should preserve that resource. Those questions are most nearly answered in the section that lists
Congress' findings. That section identifies the problem as merely an economic one — namely,
that industrial accidents are a burden on the economy. It does not even suggest that there is value
to preserving life and limb per se.
Assuming arguendo, however, that Congress wanted to preserve life and limb for its own
sake, and that economic benefit or loss was irrelevant, that purpose largely reinforces the thesis of
this article — broad application of the subjective standard of the OSHA regulation, 29 C.F.R. 5
1977.12 (1980), will lead to more instances of refusal to work for safety reasons, thus furthering
the assumed purpose of the Act. The hard case, therefore, is based on the assumption that Con-
gress wanted to increase productivity, and that safety is a means, not an end.
15° Compare Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368,
386-87 (1974) with Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1980); Marshall v.
Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Marshall v. Daniel
Constr. Co., Inc., 563 F.2d 707, 708 (5th Cir. 1977). To object that no conflict exists between
the approaches because different sources of law are involved misses a fundamental point. Neither
the OSHA regulation nor 5 502 mandates the means which have been adopted to meet their
ends. There is nothing in the language of S 502 or its history to suggest or require the construc-
tion given in Gateway Coal, The Court's reasons for the objective evidence construction further its
20-year policy of encouraging arbitration and discouraging strikes. Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at
385-87. The Court explicitly burdened Congress with the task of clearly commanding a looser
construction of 502. Id. at 386. Similarly, nothing in the language of the OSHA regulation re-
quires the interpretation given to it in Whirlpool. The regulation uses the words "good faith" and
"reasonable person" to trigger protection. The operative words of 502 are also "good faith."
There is, therefore, no a priori reason to conclude that S 502 requires objective evidence but that
the regulation's requirements are satisifed by something less exacting. Because Congress and the
Secretary chose not to define terms, courts could reasonably have arrived at identical construc-
tions for 5 502 and the OSHA regulation. The fact that they have not done so creates the conflict.
171 A proper case is one in which there is a collective bargaining agreement with a no-
strike clause, and the employee can prove that his fear of unsafe conditions was reasonable, but
cannot prove that it was accurate.
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decide which set of assumptions will lead to a superior method of increasing
production and commerce.'"
There are at least three ways to approach the question of whether expand-
ing Gateway Coal or expanding Whirlpool is the proper solution to the problem of
reasonably perceived, but not objectively proven, imminent danger in the
workplace. Two situations merit special attention: (1) cases in which there ex-
ists a general no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement, and (2)
cases in which the agreement specifically waives rights under the OSHA
regulation.
First, an analysis of Whirlpool could begin by noting that none of the
Whirlpool opinions states or suggests whether the plant was unionized, whether
a collective bargaining agreement governed employment, nor, if a collective
bargaining agreement did exist, whether it contained a no-strike clause. Thus,
Whirlpool could be read narrowly, to apply only where there is not a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, since there is no mention
of a collective bargaining agreement, even the implied no-strike clause cases
need not be considered to conflict with Whirlpool. Such an analysis effectively
reconciles Whirlpool with Gateway Coal. A second interpretation could be that
Whirlpool effectively overrules Gateway Coal. This reading assumes that Whirl-
pool would apply to cases in which a no-strike clause exists, ' 53 reducing Gateway
Coal's scope to cases in which neither OSHA nor MSHA is applicable, and to
cases where the employee inexplicably fails to force the Secretary to bring the
suit. Third, particular trades of safety guarantees for economic benefits in the
collective bargaining agreement could be judged on a case-by-case basis, with
the courts deciding on the facts of each case whether concerns for safety or con-
tinuous production should prevail. This approach could apply only to the issue
of whether to allow a waiver of OSHA regulation rights, not to whether OSHA
should apply to a general no-strike clause.
The remainder of this article will explore these three possible readings of
Whirlpool. It will be shown that the narrow reading of Whirlpool, which limits an
employee's right to stop working to cases where a collective bargaining agree-
ment does not contain a no-strike clause, is, notwithstanding its merits, an in-
' 52
 An illustration may serve to crystallize the differences between the two approaches.
Gateway Coal represents the car owner who believes that his money is most efficiently spent by
driving his car hard, spending as little as possible for necessary repairs, and then junking the
machine when it requires major work. The OSHA regulation is like the driver who is slower,
more cautious, and spends money on preventive maintenance, all in an effort to prolong the life
of his car. The OSHA car may well last longer, but whether it costs less per mile than the Gateway
Coal automobile is unknown. Similarly, it is not clear whether Gateway Coal or OSHA represents
a more efficient use of labor.
'" There is no mention of a union, collective bargaining agreement, or no-strike clause
in Whirlpool. None of the other cases that considered the regulation mentioned the existence or
absence of a no-strike clause. The only reference to this aspect of the problem was in Usery v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., [1976.77] OSHA DEC. (CCH) 21,330, at 25,615-4 n.5 (E.D. Mich.
1976). There the court cited a piece of legislative history, 116 CONG. REC. 38,393 (1970)
(remarks of Rep. Michel), that claimed that OSHA would encourage employees to disregard
contractual no-strike obligations. Id.
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appropriate approach to safety cases. The broader interpretation of Whirlpool,
which allows an employee to refuse to work on the basis of safety concerns
regardless of whether a no-strike clause exists, will be examined with regard to
a general no-strike clause as well as to explicit waiver clauses or trade-offs of
safety protection in collective bargaining agreements. The liberal approach of
Whirlpool, it will be shown, requires that a union not be allowed to bargain
away safety rights in return for economic benefits. Finally, the value of a case-
by-case approach to particular trade-offs of safety protection by unions will be
presented. Analysis of all three interpretations will demonstrate not only that
an employee should be allowed to stop working due to unsafe conditions
without having to submit his grievances to arbitration, but also that no labor
union should be allowed to waive or to trade any of the OSHA protections.
A. The General No-Strike Clause
The first suggested reading of Whirlpool, denying an employee the right to
refuse work in cases where a collective bargaining agreement can be read as
containing a no-strike clause, accommodates the case with Gateway Coal. Such
an analysis leaves the Gateway Coal effect on no-strike clauses intact. In addi-
tion, such a reading is consistent with a notion basic to contract law — that an
individual should be responsible for his mistakes, at least after promising not to
err. Whenever an employee refuses work, there is a net loss to the economy. To
be sure, the loss is small if one employee fails to work one shift, but the loss ex-
ists nonetheless. Furthermore, if many employees fail to work many shifts, the
loss becomes more substantial. The real issue, then, is who should bear the loss
caused by such refusals to work, the employee, or society as a whole? If the
former, then Whirlpool should not apply to no-strike clause cases; if the latter,
then Whirlpool should protect the employee and pass the loss on to the rest of
society.
The standards of conduct this society sets for its members also supports
the first application of Whirlpool. Absent an enforceable promise to the con-
trary, our society generally holds its members to a standard not more exacting
than reasonableness. Tort law generally invokes liability only if a defendant
has behaved unreasonably. 154 Contract law, on the other hand, generally holds
an individual to his promise, whether the promise was reasonable or not.' 55
Thus, absent a promise, the loss occasioned by reasonable but destructive con-
duct is usually left where it falls. A promise, however, usually requires the
promisor to bear the consequences of his conduct. Under a purely contractual
analysis, then, the application of the OSHA regulation, Whirlpool, or any
similar right to refuse work that might emerge from MSHA could be limited to
cases in which the labor contract does not contain a general no-strike clause.
Emphasis on the contractual nature of the employee-employer relation-
ship, then, supports a narrow reading of the Whirlpool decision. Furthermore,
15+ See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 145-52 (4th ed. 1971).
155 See generally J. D. CALAMARI & J.M. PERRILLO, CONTRACTS ch. 1 (2d ed. 1977).
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to construe the OSHA regulation as warranting an employee refusal to work
only in the absence of a no-strike clause does not render the safety statutes
nullities. The statutes would continue to bOlster the right of non-union labor to
refuse work on the basis of reasonably perceived unsafe conditions — a right
recognized under section 7 of the Wagner Act. 156 Furthermore, unionized
labor could make use of the right to refuse work provisions at the bargaining
table. The union could trade those rights, in whole or in part, for other kinds of
benefits.
Notwithstanding the merits of a narrow reading of Whirlpool, there is
much support for the proposition that the protections offered by the OSHA
regulation should not be limited to cases where there is an absence of a no-
strike clause. The Supreme Court has ruled that strikes do not always violate a
general no-strike clause, thus creating a foundation for broad construction of
the OSHA regulation. In Mastro Plastics,' 57 for example, the Court held that a
strike to protest an unfair labor practice was protected activity under section 7
of the NLRA, and a no-strike clause had not forfeited that right. 15H Despite the
apparently all-embracing language of the no-strike clause in Mastro Plastics,'"
the Court ruled that the clause was intended to cover only issues concerning the
economic relationship between the parties. ' 6° The Court said that such issues
were limited to grievances which allege, on their face, nothing more than a
defect in normal plant operations."' A dispute that arose from an abnormal
event at the plant might not be within the jurisdiction of the no-strike clause.' 52
The Court held that an unfair labor practice was such an abnormal event,
because, on its face, the grievance was outside the scope of the items
negotiated, and hence not subject to the arbitration and no-strike clause."'
Similarly, in Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers of America,'" the Court
declined to order an injunction as a remedy for a strike in apparent violation of
a no-strike clause, because the cause of the strike was not subject to the Boys
Markets presumption of arbitrability. The Court said that an injunction is
authorized under Boys Market only if the Court, or lower court, concludes that
the issue that precipitated the strike was one over which the parties were bound
to arbitrate."' Accordingly, the Buffalo Forge Court ordered postponement of
an injunction until the arbitrator could decide whether the no-strike clause em-
136 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976), discussed in text at notes 120-27 supra.
137 350 U.S. 270 (1956), discussed in text at notes 36-42 supra.
"8
 350 U.S. at 281-84.
1S9 Id. at 281. The union pledge provided that there would be "no interference of any
kind with the operations of the Employers, or any interruptions or slackening of production of
work by any of its members." Id. The union also pledged "to refrain from any strike or work
stoppage." Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 281-83.
I6Z Id. at 283-84.
163 Id.
164 428 U.S. 397 (1976). See discussion in text at notes 41-48 supra.
165 Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1976).
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braced this type of strike.' 66
 Because the Gateway Coal Court said that the issues
of arbitrability and enjoinability of a strike are analytically distinct, though
generally coterminous,' 67 two questions must be answered to decide if an in-
junction is warranted in light of Buffalo Forge: (1) is the issue that precipitated
the grievance within the arbitration clause, and (2) does a strike over that issue
breach the no-strike clause? One key to an exception to the Boys Markets pre-
166
 Buffalo Forge is either a major retreat from Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), an extremely narrow decision, correct for reasons not
stated in the opinion, or wrongly decided.
In Buffalo Forge the district court found that the arbitration clause did not cover sympathy
strikes. 428 U.S. at 402-03. That finding was not challenged in the Supreme Court. Id. at 407.
The Supreme Court concluded that, under Boys Markets, the district court has both the power and
the duty to make an initial determination of arbitrability. Id. There is nothing in the Court's
opinion that restricts the subject of that determination. The language of the arbitration/no-strike
clause was as broad as could be, without specifying every type of dispute to which it applied. See
note 43 supra. A district court, therefore, is now free to decide whether an issue is arbitrable, and
hence, whether a strike is enjoinable. As the dissent in Buffalo Forge stated, "[t]he Court [held]
that only a part of the union's quid pro quo is enforceable by injunction." 428 U.S. at 413
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
In the Supreme Court, however, the employer conceded the accuracy of the district
court's findings, including a finding that the arbitration clause did not cover sympathy strikes.
Id. at 403, 407. With that concession, Buffalo Forge is significantly different from Boys Markets.
Certainly parties are free to agree to arbitrate or not, even if national labor policy, as created by
the Court, prefers arbitration and no-strike clauses. Some members of the Supreme Court are
readier than others to imply a no-strike or arbitration clause, or to read such clauses broadly. Yet
if the parties agree that the issue is only permissibly arbitrable, not mandatorily so, then it is dif-
ficult to see why a mandatory no-strike clause should be imposed on the parties. At the same
time, the parties' concession means that Buffalo Forge holds only that absent mandatory arbitra-
tion there can be no pre-arbitration injunction, a proposition that is not obvious but is no bolder
than implying a no-strike clause where none exists at all, See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-06 (1962), discussed in text at notes 27-28 supra.
Alternatively, Freed, Injunctions Against Sympathy Strikes: In Defense of Buffalo Forge, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 289 (1979), argues that the strike in Buffalo Forge was not over a grievance be-
tween the union and employer, hence did not disturb the quid pro quo nature of the deal between
the parties, and thus should not have been subject to injunction before (not mandatory but
agreed-upon) arbitration. Id. at 323-26.
Professor Freed suggests a sensible limit to the Buffalo Forge exemption from Boys Markets.
It the employer had exchanged binding arbitration for a promise not to strike with the primary
unions, thus making the primary strike enjoinable under Boys Markets, the sympathy strike should
also be enjoinable. Id. at 326-27. This is so because the employer has bargained collectively and
as a result has obtained promises not to disrupt production over grievances from all unions in-
volved. Having given binding arbitration for those promises, he ought to get the specific benefit
of his combined bargain. Id.
Finally, see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 413-32
(1976) (Justice Stevens, dissenting, with whom Justices Brennan, Marshall and Powell joined).
Justice Stevens argued that not to issue the injunction would destroy an important part of the quid
pro quo character that the Court had given to promises to arbitrate and promises not to strike. Id.
at 413. The Court's opinion, he wrote, would open a large hole in the policy of encouraging
employers to agree to arbitration clauses, because employers will not know what they are getting.
Id. at 423, 424. Justice Stevens' argument appears compelling'as well as consistent with the trend
to encourage arbitration and no-strikes. He did not, however, mention that the parties had
stipulated to the district court's findings, and that the majority treated the district court's state-
ment that the sympathy strike was not mandatorily arbitrable as one of those stipulated findings.
167 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974).
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sumption, then, is whether the parties were bound to arbitrate the grievance at
issue.
It is reasonable to conclude that a strike conducted as a result of safety
violations is not an arbitrable issue under a collective bargaining agreement.
Given the federal government's substantial involvement in occupational safe-
ty, which OSHA and MSHA evidence, it could be said that Congress found it
undesirable to leave resolution of safety issues in the hands of an arbitrator.
Absent affirmative evidence that the workers had opted to submit safety issues
to arbitration, the workers apparently had not intended to proceed in a direc-
tion contrary to Congress' expression. Similarly, given organized labor's
known efforts on behalf of safety legislation,'" it is even more doubtful that a
union would have intended its no-strike obligation to extend to imminent
threats to safe working conditions, nor would it be reasonable for an employer
to disagree. Thus, a general no-strike/arbitration clause reasonably can be con-
strued not to include safety strikes. Although some language in Gateway Coal
seems contrary to this position, 169 the Supreme Court did not necessarily reject
the argument. In Gateway Coal the Court did not construe the collective
bargaining agreement against the backdrop of the safety statutes invoked here.
The union evidently did not make an argument based on MSHA, the ap-
plicable safety statute, nor did the Court address the bearing of MSHA on the
case. The Court's language in Gateway Coal should be considered in the context
of that case. Whether the Court would have construed the contract in the same
way had it considered MSHA remains uncertain.'"
The special nature of the rights endowed on employees by the safety
statutes, then, supports a broad reading of the Whirlpool decision. A second
reason to prefer a broad application of Whirlpool is that a narrow reading does
not rely on the policy behind Gateway Coal. Therefore, Whirlpool is not a prin-
cipled reconciliation of the cases but, rather, marks a new direction taken by
the Court in the area of employee safety. If the right to strike over safety condi-
tions is to be limited, as Gateway Coal would have it, on the ground that strikes
168 See The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The Right to Refuse  Work Under Hazar-
dous Conditions, 1979 WASH. L.Q. 571-72 & n.6; but compare Atileson, supra note 56, at 656 & n.53.
169 The Court may have meant to say that the union intended, and the employer
understood the union to intend, that both the arbitration and no-strike clauses applied to immi-
nent safety threats. By definition, the drawn-out arbitration process cannot resolve such
grievances quickly enough. If the Court thought that the parties had those intentions, then the
Court was probably wrong. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 466
F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972), read, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), discussed in text at notes 59-69 supra. Also,
the Court's ruling on that phase of the case should be limited, distinguished, and generally avoid-
ed whenever an appropriate device exists. See, e.g. , Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations
Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 776 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 595 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Baker v. United States Dept. of Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 595 F.2d 746
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
170 Shortly after the decision in Gateway Coal, and with full awareness of it, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Phillips v. Interior Bd. of
Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court considered the impact of
MSHA where the employees refused work due to allegedly unsafe conditions despite the presence
of a broad no-strike clause. Indeed, Phillips involved the same collective bargaining agreement
present in Gateway Coal. 500 F.2d at 776 n.15. For discussion of Phillips and its progeny, see text
at notes 134-40 supra. See also text at notes 174-75, and note 174 infra.
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retard production more than do unsafe conditions, then Whirlpool was wrongly
decided. The result in Whirlpool gives a right to leave work over unsafe condi-
tions. The legislation, however, did not compel the Court to uphold the OSHA
regulation at issue in Whirlpool. Either result, upholding the regulation or in-
validating it, would have been reasonable, because there was enough
legislative history on which to rely if the Court believed that striking down the
regulation would represent sounder policy. The Court, it seems, thus freely
adopted a new approach towards worker safety. 17 '
A third consideration that supports a broad interpretation of Whirlpool is
that a narrow reading and application of the case would be contrary to the
growth of the national policy to promote safety in the workplace. Significantly,
Congress has pursued a different course of action in this area than has the
Court. In Boys Markets, the Court lifted an explicit prohibition against federal
courts enjoining strikes. Thus, the Court overruled a decision only eight years
old'" and reversed one of the greatest triumphs of the early labor movement.
In addition, the Court had to explain why an apparently explicit prohibition of
federal court injunctions of strikes' 73 no longer made sense, although it had not
been repealed. But even as the Court handed down this significant decision to
seal the arbitration/no-strike/continuous-production policy, the Congress was
enacting the MSHA and OSHA. Those Acts placed responsibility for occupa-
tional safety primarily outside the hands of both the Labor Board, the agency
designated to mediate the formation and viability of organized labor, and the
courts. While Congress began to separate issues of employee safety from other
labor concerns, lower federal courts tried to avoid the results of a broad ap-
plication of the Supreme Court's policy underlying Gateway Coal. Gateway Coal,
probably the zenith of no-strike clause enforcement because it enjoined a safety
strike, began to be judicially undermined only months after it was handed
down. The District of Columbia Circuit almost immediately began to read
MSHA broadly' 74 with only a passing reference to Gateway. 15 The Supreme
"' The legislative history that would support a decision to invalidate the regulation is set
out at length in Marshal! v. Daniel Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 712-15 (5th Cir. 1977) and ac-
companying notes (invalidating regulation).
' 72 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
273 Section 4 of the Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
174 See cases cited and discussed in text and notes at notes 137-41 supra. That Phillips
should have been the beginning of the line of cases that tended to undermine Gateway Coal is both
ironic, and suggestive of how the law can develop. It may be recalled that Gateway Coal came to
the Court from the Third Circuit, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973), where the union had prevailed.
Judge William Hastie wrote the opinion for the court of appeals, manifesting considerable con-
cern for the safety of coal miners. By chance, Judge Hastie sat by designation on the District of
Columbia Circuit when Phillips came before that court. Although he did not write the opinion,
there was a dissent, so Judge Hastie's vote was necessary for the result. The Munsey and Baker
cases, supra, Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Munsey v. Federal Mine Safe-
ty & Health Comm'n, 595 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and Baker v. United States Dept. of In-
terior Bd., 595 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1978), extended the reach of Phillips. Munsey and Baker show-
ed that several judges in the District of Columbia Circuit accepted the fundamental principle
behind Phillips, that courts should, if reasonable, put safety considerations above no-strike
policies. In Whirlpool the Supreme Court seems finally to have agreed. Thus, Judge Hastie's
views may ultimately have triumphed, and possibly because of his coincidental presence on the
Phillips panel.
15 Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 776 n.15 (1974).
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Court's own treatment of Gateway in Whirlpool is instructive. The Court cited
Gateway once, in a footnote, and, ironically, for the proposition that even
without the OSHA regulation, federal law, specifically section 7 of the NLRA
and section 502 of the LMRA, provided workers a right to refuse labor under
hazardous conditions. 16 That citation to Gateway Coal does not mention the ob-
jective evidence standard endorsed in that case, nor does it note that the regula-
tion at issue in Whirlpool required a lesser standard.
That Gateway Coal was the culmination of a common law development
beginning with Lincoln Mills"' suggests a fourth reason to read Whirlpool broad-
ly. The Court's decision in Lincoln Mills inferred from the nebulous legislative
history of the LMRA18 a desire for the courts to create substantive labor law.
Although open to severe criticism,' 79 it seems likely that the outcome of the case
was a desirable one. The decision both saved and encouraged the growth of
binding labor-management contracts, and does not appear to contravene con-
gressional intent. It is quite different, however, to set up an element of that
judge-made law against a statute that specifically deals with one aspect of
labor-management relations, and claim that the judge-made law is entitled to
greater respect than regulations issued under the statute, and approved by the
Supreme Court.
Finally, Boys Markets does not purport to make an injunction the proper
response to every strike in violation of a no-strike clause. The Court insisted
that ordinary equity requirements must be met, including a determination that
" the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the
union from its issuance.' "'" The existence of OSHA and MSHA, the state-
ment of congressional findings"' and purposes in those statutes,'" and the
Secretary's regulation, all suggest that Congress has already struck the balance
in safety cases. A court of equity should always, therefore, conclude that if the
situation described in the regulation exists"' an employer will never suffer
more from the denial of an injunction than an employee will from its issuance.
In summary, there is ample support for the proposition that the OSHA
regulation should be construed to apply to those situations where a general no-
The court there distinguished Gateway Coal on the ground that in Gateway the union had done
nothing to begin the statutory mine safety complaint process. Id.
' 76
 445 U.S. 1 at 17-18 n.29.
'" See discussion in text at notes 14-35 supra.
' 78 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
452, and Justice Frankfurter dissenting, at 462, for a discussion of the legislative history.
179 Id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
' 8° Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970)
(quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord, Buf-
falo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1976).
18 ' 29 U.S.C. $ 651(a) (1976); 30 U.S.C. $ 801(a-1) (1976).
187 29 U.S.C. $ 651(b) (1976); 30 U.S.C. $ 801(g) (1976).
' 83 Cf. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (June 17, 1981)
(Courts may not require the Secretary to analyze costs and benefits of a particular safety stand-
ard, because Congress has already done cost-benefit analysis, and has decided that safety, where
feasible, is a benefit that is always greater than its cost.).
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strike clause exists. The special treatment that both Congress and the federal
courts have accorded to the problem of safety in the workplace, as well as
established principles of equity, demonstrate that the Whirlpool decision marks
a new direction taken by the Supreme Court in the area of worker safety. This
national concern for employee safety would be unduly limited by a narrow
reading of the scope of the OSHA regulation.
B. Explicit Waiver Clauses
If the OSHA regulation protects a worker who refuses hazardous work
conditions in the case of a general no-strike clause, a more difficult issue arises.
Suppose that collective bargaining produces a no-strike clause that explicitly
includes a commitment not to strike or otherwise refuse to work on the ground
that work conditions are hazardous. Such an agreement might even go so far as
specifically to renounce the right given in the OSHA regulation. To put the
most difficult case, assume that the agreement recites specific consideration for
the waiver. Should such a clause be enforced? A court might choose not to en-
force the clause on the ground that it is unconscionable or contrary to public
policy. A court that enforced the clause would probably summon freedom of
contract notions, assert that Congress expected unions to represent employees
adequately, and emphasize that the union had won a concession from the
employer in exchange.
The real issue, though, is whether Congress' purpose would be served by
putting another tool in labor's camp, to be used as is or traded for some other
benefit, at labor's option. That statement of the issue suggests another for-
mulation — whether production and commerce are better served by forced
safety or by permitting a group of workers, through representatives of only ma-
jority selection,'" to trade safety for some other benefits. A judge who voids a
trade of employee safety for economic benefits will probably do so on one of
two theories. He might reason that Congress has made the decision that safety
is to be given top priority, and that it is not within the court's province to per-
mit a different arrangement. Alternatively, he might base his decision on a
finding that to impose safety on the workplace will result in more net produc-
tion than will allowing safety to be traded for union benefits. A judge who
allows such a trade will first have to decide that Congress did not intend to dic-
tate the route to the desired goal of maximum net production, thus warranting
a decision that employees will be more productive if they receive an economic
benefit than if safety measures are imposed upon them. Such a judge would be
very likely to adopt this view in cases where the collective bargaining agree-
ment reflects that conclusion by explicitly making the trade of safety for
economic benefits. While it is probably true that some workers will be more
productive if their wages are higher than if conditions are safe, courts do not
184 Section 9(a) of the Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 159(a) (1976), provides that an entity
that has majority support in a given bargaining unit represents all of the employees in that unit,
and has authority to bargain, with binding effect, for the whole unit.
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allow full freedom of contract to reign when other policies are adjudged to be
more important.' 85 The structure of OSHA suggests that courts should not per-
mit unions to trade safety rights for economic benefit. Five circuits of the
United States courts of appeals as well as several district courts, have thus far
held that OSHA does not provide a private cause of action for personal in-
juries. 186 These decisions support a holding that a union may not trade safety
for economic benefit. If Congress had intended to confer a benefit on workers
personally, a personal remedy for deprivation of that benefit would probably
also have been provided. From Congress' decision not to provide such a
remedy, it follows that the safety rules do not exist largely as a personal benefit
to workers. Rather, the predominant purpose of the Act is to benefit society by
preventing both injury and the costs associated with injury. Trading safety will
not accomplish that goal, but enforcing safety will.
Explicit support for the conclusion that employee rights under OSHA are
not waivable can be found in the purpose of the OSHA statute. Congress' find-
ings, enacted into law as part of OSHA,'" specifically state that work-related
injuries and illnesses burden and disrupt commerce. The statement of purpose,
also enacted into law,'" expresses concern for employees' work conditions as
well as concern for the nation's human resources. Since Congress stated
specific safety objectives, trades of safety protection for economic benefit will
hinder attainment of Congress' stated goals. Such trades are therefore contrary
to the reasons that led Congress to enact OSHA.
In addition to the findings and purposes of OSHA, Congress took care to
say, in the Act itself, that OSHA was not designed to create a new basis for a
private recovery for damages.' 89 Congress was content to allow existing and
evolving law to take care of the worker who is injured because an employer
does not comply with OSHA standards.' 9° Since Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action in OSHA, and since the courts have uniformly
refused to find that the statute provides that remedy, 19 ' it follows that the pur-
pose of the statute is predominantly public and should be so construed. One
185 See, e.g., U .C.C. 5 2-302 (1972 version) (unconscionable contracts).
"6
 Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 258-64 (6th Cir. 1980) provides the fulles
discussion of the issue. Accord, Davo Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
613 F.2d 1227, 1230 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980); Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th
Cir. 1975); Byrd v, Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Russell v.
Bartley, 494 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 483 F.2d
67 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) affirming on basis of lower court opinion, 356 F. Supp. 670, 671-72
(E.D. La. 1973)).
' 87 29 U.S.C. 5 651(a) (1976). The relevant portion is quoted in text at note 148 supra.
18e 29 U.S.C. 5 651(b) (1976). The relevant portion is quoted in text at note 147 supra.
189
 29 U.S.C. 653(b)(4) (1976). The relevant provision is: "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to
enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties or
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment." Id,
19° Id.; Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1975); Russell v.
Bartley, 494 F.2d 334, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1974).
' 8 ' See cases cited at note 186 supra.
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element of such a construction is to prohibit and invalidate contractual provi-
sions that trade safety protection for economic benefit.
The courts, therefore, ought not allow unions to waive OSHA-MSHA
protections in collective bargaining agreements. The statutes represent many
years of legislative consideration and deliberation about what is best for the na-
tional welfare. A particular group of workers should not be able to trade its
contribution to the general welfare for gains to the union itself. While one
might argue that to allow such trades will increase production, Congress has
decided that they will not.' 92 Furthermore, there is no justification for putting
another bargaining tool in labor's hands. If the courts allow safety protections
to be treated as bargaining tools, the government would be well advised to do
away with such protections in order to maintain its historically neutral position
at the bargaining table.'"
C. Case-by-Case Analysis
The third possible reading of Whirlpool is to judge trades of safety for
economic benefits on a case-by-case basis. Whenever an employee invokes the
regulation and his employer defends with an explicit safety for economic bene-
fit trade clause, the courts could decide whether to allow the particular safety
item in question to be traded without formulating an absolute rule. Although
courts often strive for a case-by-case approach to law,'" to do so in this context
would frustrate the policies of safety and freedom of contract, the two policies
at stake here, and therefore should be rejected.
At a minimum, the case-by-case approach contemplates collective
bargaining sessions in which neither party knows whether the clause upon
which they agree will be effective. The union will be unable to bind the
employees and will also be unable to guarantee them the benefit for which it
traded the regulation's protection. Only one sufficiently dissatisfied employee
is necessary to test and perhaps destroy the trade. Similarly, the employer will
not know whether he has successfully bought freedom from disruption of pro-
duction. Generally the fine-tuning of government interference with private
relationships that a case-by-case approach provides is valuable because it
minimizes such interference. Such an approach, however, would not be a
worthwhile one under the OSHA regulation. A case-by-case approach is
valuable only after concluding that Congress has decided to occupy a large
area, the exact size of which is as yet unknown. In the OSHA situation,
192 See text and notes at notes 183-85 supra.
' 9 ' Although research had revealed no decisions on the point, it is a corollary of the ap-
proach suggested that the employer could refuse, at any time, to perform on the promise he made
in exchange for the waiver. This adds an element of uncertainty about the meaning of the con-
tract, and hence, instability to labor-management relations. If it were decided that such clauses
were void, the instability would vanish.
194 See, e.g., Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737, 741 (1947) ("The search for relevant
meaning is often satisfied not by a futile attempt at abstract definition but by pricking a line
through concrete applications. Meaning frequently is built up by assured recognition of what
does not come within a concept the content of which is in controversy.").
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though, the affected parties will be unable to know for an extended period of
time, if ever, which aspects of their relationship are within their control and
which the Congress has preempted through OSHA's safety provisions. Thus,
the value of minimizing interference by fine-tuning is greatly diminished, if not
lost altogether.
The uncertainty which a case-by-case analysis imposes upon labor and
management is not the only troubling aspect of such an approach. For exam-
ple, rather than decide that particular safety protections can always be traded
and that others cannot, courts might make finer distinctions, depending on the
precise circumstances of each case. Trading a particular safety protection
might be upheld in one case because the nature of the workplace permits the
conclusion that that protection is not especially important in that shop. Yet the
same protection in another shop could be deemed too important to permit a
trade. Such narrowly written opinions would result in great unpredictability,
and hence frustrate the goals of both collective bargaining and safety legisla-
tion. Furthermore, more broadly written opinions, attempting to deal uniform-
ly with a particular protection, can create similar uncertainties, since lawyers
can be expected to search for factual differences between cases and to urge such
distinctions upon courts. This article has offered reasons to adopt a broad rule
that gives safety legislation priority over no-strike clauses. 195 The case-by-case
approach would frustrate the purposes of collective bargaining as well as those
of safety. Consequently, such a method is an inappropriate means of balancing
the interest of safety against that of continuous production.' 96
'" See text at notes 186-93 supra.
196
 The premises of government regulation of private relationships in general, although
beyond the scope of this article, lend additional support to application of the regulation despite an
explicit contractual waiver of OSHA protection, and a fortiori, to application of the regulation in
the face of a general no-strike clause. Implicit in the Constitution's guarantee that property shall
not be taken without due process of law is an initial premise that persons protected by the Con-
stitution shall be free to structure their business relationships as they please. See, e.g. , Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Dairy Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 722-23 (1981) (legitimate state purpose must be cited
to support legislation); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1937); See generally L. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law
ch. 8 (1978). The Constitution promises that the government shall not interfere with those rela-
tionships unless experience in a particular area shows that a laissez faire policy produces problems
that should be solved, but will not be resolved satisfactorily without governmental action. E.g. ,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (sustaining constitutionality of
NLRA). To be sure, the government retains power to decide when it should act, and initial
government interference, in areas such as crime, tort, contract and property, is centuries old.
There also is, at present, massive governmental interference in and regulation of our lives. Yet
the justifications for regulation ought still to be that private enterprise has failed to solve a pro-
blem that the government decides must be solved. E.g. , 5 1 of the NLRA (Wagner Act), 29
U.S.C. 5 151 (1976); 5 2 of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. 5 651(b) (1976); 5 1 of MSHA, 30 U.S.C. S 801
(1976).
Given the premise that government action is justified only if the private sector fails, it
follows that enactment of the safety acts means that safety is a problem that Congress has decided
must be solved, and that private arrangements will not be able to solve the problem. The purpose
of regulation is to provide a specific remedy for a specific evil. It is not to create a right that may
then be bartered for some other item desired by the party to whom the right is given and offered
by the party against whom the right exists.
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One variation of trading rights granted by OSHA deserves special con-
sideration. Suppose that a union believes that a particular condition, call it
condition X, is dangerous, but that the OSH Administration does not, and
hence does not require the employer to correct it. At collective bargaining the
union proposes to waive the employees' right under the regulation with respect
to some other condition, say condition A, if the employer will correct condition
X. The employer agrees. Here the parties have traded safety for safety, except
that the regulation might not protect an employee who refused to work on the
grounds that condition X had not been repaired. This possibility exists because
the Administration had already determined that condition X was not
dangerous, and OSHA's protections are triggered only when the Administra-
tion classifies a condition as dangerous.'" The safety-for-safety trade,
however, arguably furthers Congress' purpose in enacting OSHA even if the
Administration disagrees with the employees about which conditions are more
dangerous. Here, perhaps, the union ought to be able to use OSHA as a
bargaining tool.
Two considerations, however, militate against permitting even the safety-
for-safety trade. First, although the union represents all the employees, that
representation exists by statutory fiat,' 98 not because each employee in fact
wants the union as his representative. A significant minority, indeed, at times
even a majority, of the employees may not desire the union to represent them.
Although the union has broad powers to negotiate on behalf of all the
employees, the safety acts could be viewed as non-negotiable. The provisions
thus afford union non-adherents some protection against a union's broad
representative status. Just as the union may not trade society's interest in safe-
ty for the economic interests of the employees, so too, it may not determine that
non-statutory safety protections are more desirable than those included within
the statute.
The safety-for-safety trade, then, can be viewed as a subversion of a
legislative enactment. In addition, such trades could be used to disguise a
safety-for-economic-benefit trade. The condition that the union selects, condi-
tion X, may not be unsafe at all, and may be easy to repair. Indeed, the fact
that the Administration chose not to designate the condition as dangerous sug-
gests that the condition was not dangerous. Thus, in exchange for the waiver
To be sure, the holder of a right may choose not to assert it, and often does so. This oc-
curs, however, when the beneficiary elects not to approach the organs of government and request
their assistance to coerce the alleged offender. The victim makes this choice after his right has
been invaded. The system could allow the choice to be made beforehand. In opting for the post-
injury approach, however, the system appears to assume that an informed choice can be made
only after the victim has received the injury, or is in imminent peril of suffering the injury. The
right, therefore, cannot be protected if its holder may forfeit it in a setting that does not adequate-
ly acquaint him with the consequences of his decision. Given this theory of government regula-
tion, arguments based on the precepts of private contract disappear because the legislature's ac-
tion has explicitly removed them from consideration. Examples can be found throughout the field
of regulated industries generally. Rate-making commissions are an excellent example.
in 29 U.S.C. SS 658(a), 659 (1976).
"8 29 U.S.C. S 159(a) (1976).
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with regard to condition A, the condition that is dangerous in fact, the
employer may give the union a better economic package sub rosa. This com-
bination of government pre-emption of the definition of dangerous conditions
and the possibility of abuses of safety-for-safety trades suggests that such prac-
tices ought not be allowed.
This conclusion, however, has serious implications for the present struc-
ture of labor-management relations. Collective bargaining agreements often
provide for a multi-step grievance procedure.' 99 Safety-based grievances will
normally be within the scope of the contract's grievance provisions. 200 The in-
itial stages of the procedure will be attempts to settle a grievance within the
plant, by having representatives of union and of management endeavor to
reach a resolution. 20 ' The grievance procedure generally leads to binding ar-
bitration. 202 This system has become a nearly indispensable part of our
economy. Thus, unions and management have for some time been making
safety-for-safety trades, or at least have contracted for a system that con-
templates and implements such trades. When the union agrees in the collective
bargaining agreement to accept the arbitrator's decision, it forfeits its rights
under the OSHA regulation. Under ordinary notions of contract construction,
the union would be required to abide by its promise to arbitrate."' If the
safety-for-safety trade is prohibited, the grievance committee, as well as the
rest of the grievance procedure, loses its value in the safety area.
Although that change in the effectiveness of private dispute resolution ar-
rangements is disturbing because it may upset a system that seems to handle
difficult issues well, some courts have already held that an employee dissatis-
fied with an arbitrator's award may proceed de nova in court under the safety
acts. 204 The unarticulated assumption behind these decisions must be that
Congress did not intend to allow safety trades. Otherwise, the courts would be
expected to let a workable system alone."' The grievance committees,
however, are not subject to the concerns that should lead to general prohibition
of safety-for-safety trades. They are not likely to disguise safety-for-economic-
benefit trades,'" because there is no way to guarantee the deal. They are
199 E.g., Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 338 (1972); Knight-Morley
Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 160 (1956), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Knight-Morley Corp., 251
F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied sub noon. Knight-Morley v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
200
 See cases cited at note 199 supra. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, 414 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1974).
201 See cases cited at note 199 supra.
2" See, e.g., cases cited at notes 199-200 supra.
2" Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 386-87
(1974); Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455-56
(1957).
204 E.g., N.L. Indus., [1980] OSHA DEC. (CCH) i 24,354, at 29,689-90 (7th Cir.
1980); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 776-77 (D.C. Cir.
1974). For district court cases in accord, see cases cited at note 113 supra.
2" See text at notes 186-93 supra.
206 It is possible, of course, that a union and an employer would have some sort of
understanding that the grievance committee would not press a particular kind of grievance. Also
the committee could be asked to screen a safety-for-economic-benefit-trade. Implementation o
such deception, however, seems unlikely.
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unlikely to suppress a minority employee interest because all grievances, in-
cluding those conditions that OSHA regulates, would be subject to the system.
Thus, there is no reason to interfere with freedom of contract here. Decisions
that permit litigation after an arbitrator's decision should be reversed. 207
In summary, a broad interpretation of OSHA and the imminent danger
regulation promulgated thereunder is the best solution to potential conflicts
between the policies of enjoining strikes under a no-strike clause and that of
promoting safety in the workplace. Unlike the narrow interpretation, that ap-
proach would be true to Congress' purpose in enacting the safety statutes and
would avoid the unpredictability of using an alternative case-by-case resolu-
tion. In Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, the Supreme Court supported the Secre-
tary's authority to issue a regulation that allows work refusals based on subjec-
tive evidence of a safety hazard. This result accentuated the conflict between
the Court's policy favoring continued production and the jegislature's goal of
promoting safety in the workplace. It is submitted that this conflict should be
resolved in favor of worker safety.
CONCLUSION
Congress intended OSHA and MSHA to have a profound impact on the
connection of the federal government to labor-management relations. Those
statutes should be construed to state and reflect a policy that supersedes
whatever policies the Supreme Court has or would have created under the
mandate it held itself to possess in Lincoln Mills. The lower courts should hold,
and the Supreme Court should state, when the appropriate case comes before
it, that OSHA and the imminent danger regulation promulgated under it, are
congressional judgments that the productivity of the nation is enhanced if
workers' subjective, but reasonable, perceptions of dangerous working condi-
tions are respected, any contractual promise to the contrary notwithstanding.
207
	 proposition is easier to accept if the arbitrator considers OSHA violations in
reaching his result. That is not, however, strictly necessary. The arbitration result could be
upheld on the ground that the union bargained for the procedure, and the individual employee
chose to use it. The proposition is not so broad as to preclude the employee from electing to
litigate through the Secretary under OSHA instead of pursuing his contractual grievance pro-
cedure remedy.
